The Ethernaut Challenge #15 Solution — Naught Coin

This is Part 15 of the “Let’s play OpenZeppelin Ethernaut CTF” series, where I will explain how to solve each challenge.

The Ethernaut is a Web3/Solidity based wargame created by OpenZeppelin. Each level is a smart contract that needs to be ‘hacked’. The game acts both as a tool for those interested in learning ethereum, and as a way to catalogue historical hacks in levels. Levels can be infinite and the game does not require to be played in any particular order.

Challenge #15: Naught Coin

NaughtCoin is an ERC20 token and you’re already holding all of them. The catch is that you’ll only be able to transfer them after a 10 year lockout period. Can you figure out how to get them out to another address so that you can transfer them freely? Complete this level by getting your token balance to 0.

Things that might help:
-
The ERC20 Spec
- The OpenZeppelin codebase

Level author(s): Kyle Riley

We have tons of NaughtCoin tokens in our balance, but we cannot withdraw them for 10 years. The goal of this challenge is to find a way to withdraw them skipping the lock period.

Study the contracts

Let’s review the contract code

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.6.0;
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";contract NaughtCoin is ERC20 {
// string public constant name = 'NaughtCoin';
// string public constant symbol = '0x0';
// uint public constant decimals = 18;
uint256 public timeLock = now + 10 * 365 days;
uint256 public INITIAL_SUPPLY;
address public player;
constructor(address _player) public ERC20("NaughtCoin", "0x0") {
player = _player;
INITIAL_SUPPLY = 1000000 * (10**uint256(decimals()));
// _totalSupply = INITIAL_SUPPLY;
// _balances[player] = INITIAL_SUPPLY;
_mint(player, INITIAL_SUPPLY);
emit Transfer(address(0), player, INITIAL_SUPPLY);
}
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public override lockTokens returns (bool) {
super.transfer(_to, _value);
}
// Prevent the initial owner from transferring tokens until the timelock has passed
modifier lockTokens() {
if (msg.sender == player) {
require(now > timeLock);
_;
} else {
_;
}
}
}

The contract is pretty simple. In the constructor the Contract mint to the player address 1_000_000 tokens.

Note: there’s a double event emission in the constructor. After the _mint execution the contract emit a Transfer event without knowing that the native implementation of the OpenZeppelin _mint function already emit a Transfer event.

The contract is overriding the transfer function by adding the lockTokens function modifier to the ERC20 implementation. Let's see what this modifier does:

// Prevent the initial owner from transferring tokens until the timelock has passed
modifier lockTokens() {
if (msg.sender == player) {
require(now > timeLock);
_;
} else {
_;
}
}

The modifier check if the msg.sender is the player and if that's the case it checks if at least 10 years have passed since the minting time.

Are our precious tokens stuck for 10 years?

To solve this contract, we need to know how the EIP (Ethereum Improvement Proposal) for the ERC20 token works and how OpenZeppelin has implemented it (the contract is using the OpenZeppelin framework library).

You can find all the information needed from these links:

There are two-way to transfer tokens:

  • via the transfer function that allow the msg.sender to directly transfer tokens to a recipient
  • via the transferFrom that allows an external arbitrary sender (that could be the owner of the tokens itself) to transfer on behalf of the owner an amount of tokens to a recipient. Before sending those tokens, the owner must have approved the sender to manage that number of tokens

Because the transfer method has been overrided by the NaughtCoin contract, we can circumvent the restriction by using the transferFrom function.

Here’s what we need to do:

1) Create a secondary account to transfer all our tokens to 2) Approve ourselves to manage the whole amount of tokens before calling transferFrom 3) Call transferFrom(player, secondaryAccount, token.balanceOf(player)) 4) Use the tokens however we want!

What should the NaughtCoin contract have implemented to really lock our token for 10 years? Instead of overriding the transfer function, they could have implemented a hook that the EIP-20 define, called _beforeTokenTransfer.

This hook is called when any kind of token transfer happen:

  • mint (transfer from 0x address to the user)
  • burn (transfer from the user to 0x address)
  • transfer
  • transferFrom

By doing so, they would have prevented this exploit.

Solution code

The solution is straightforward to implement:

function exploitLevel() internal override {
vm.startPrank(player, player);
// Create a secondary account to transfer all our tokens to
address payable tempUser = utilities.getNextUserAddress();
vm.deal(tempUser, 1 ether);
// Get the balance of tokens for the player
uint256 playerBalance = level.balanceOf(player);
// Approve ourself to manage the whole amount of tokens before calling `transferFrom`
level.approve(player, playerBalance);
// Transfer all the tokens from the player balance to the secondary account
level.transferFrom(player, tempUser, playerBalance);
vm.stopPrank(); // Assert that the player has no more tokens
assertEq(level.balanceOf(player), 0);
// Assert that the secondary account received all the tokens
assertEq(level.balanceOf(tempUser), playerBalance);
}

You can read the full solution of the challenge opening NaughtCoin.t.sol

Further reading

Disclaimer

All Solidity code, practices and patterns in this repository are DAMN VULNERABLE and for educational purposes only.

I do not give any warranties and will not be liable for any loss incurred through any use of this codebase.

DO NOT USE IN PRODUCTION.

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